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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear Delegates,

I am delighted to welcome you to the United Nations Security Council of Rajasthan Youth Conference Model United Nations 2024. It is my absolute pleasure to introduce myself as Disha, your Chairperson for this committee. I am currently a 2nd year undergraduate student pursuing BA Digital Media at the esteemed University of Leeds in the United Kingdom with a strong background in humanities.

As delegates, we hope to provide you with an enriching educational experience with a strong platform to cultivate your research skills, enhance your negotiation and public speaking skills along with putting forward viable solutions. Your capacity to work together, negotiate, and tactfully tackle these issues will be crucial in formulating resolutions that represent the combined will and concerns of the global community. Our agenda will center on the pressing and intricate issue of nuclear proliferation which holds the utmost importance. The potential utilization of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to humanity, and their proliferation enhances the likelihood of catastrophic conflict. The present global situation emphasizes the critical nature of our objective. Our discussions are essential in addressing the serious threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons.

The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia has raised concerns about nuclear escalation, which jeopardizes both regional and global stability. In the Middle East, the persistent tensions between Israel and Palestine, especially the violence in Gaza, underscore the dangers associated with both traditional and non-traditional weapons. These urgent crises require our immediate and



concentrated attention to prevent additional proliferation and advance disarmament. Our agenda is firmly based on the principles set out in the UN Charter and bolstered by international agreements like the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

It is imperative that we explore innovative and comprehensive strategies to strengthen these frameworks and safeguard global security. Get ready to dive into this session with an open mind, boundless creativity, and a resolute dedication to the values of peace and security. Let's join forces and work towards a world where the danger of nuclear proliferation is nothing but a distant memory.

Sincerely,
Disha Singh Charan
Chairperson, United Nations Security Council



INTRODUCTION

<u>Agenda</u>: Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Evaluating efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and disarmament

Regarding the working of the committee, the simulation shall follow the UNA USA Rules of Procedure but with slight modifications. However, the will of the committee shall be of paramount importance. No decision shall be taken arbitrarily by the Executive Board and complete transparency and accountability will be maintained throughout the committee proceedings.

PROOF/EVIDENCE IN THE COMMITTEE:

Evidence or proof is acceptable from sources, with regards to establishing veracity of facts including through points of order. However, that in no way, should deter you from referring to a broad spectrum of resources for your research.

News Sources

- Reuters: Any Reuters' article which unambiguously makes mention of the fact stated or is in contradiction of the fact being stated by another delegate in council can be used to substantiate arguments in the committee. (https://introducents.com/news/world)
- State-operated News Agencies: These reports can be used in support of or against the State that owns the News Agency.
- Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State Operated News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country. However, a report being denied by a certain country can still be accepted by the Executive Board as credible information.
- Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Report: https://protocol.un.org/dgacm/pls/site.nsf/files/HoM/\$FILE/HeadsofMissions.pdf
- Multilateral Organizations:
- NATO (<u>http://www.natolibguides.info/nato-russia/reports</u>)
- ASEAN (<u>http://www.aseansec.org/</u>)
- OPEC (<u>https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/336.htm</u>)



- 1. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered are credible information for this simulation.
- UN Bodies:
- i UNSC (https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/)
- ii UNGA(https://www.un.org/en/sections/general/documents/index.html)
- UN Affiliated bodies:
- i International Atomic Energy Agency (https://www.iaea.org/)
- ii World Bank (https://www.worldbank.org/)
- iii International Monetary Fund (https://www.imf.org/external/index.htm)
- iv International Committee of the Red Cross (https://www.icrc.org/en).
- · Treaty Based Bodies:
- i Antarctic Treaty System (https://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm)
- ii International Criminal Court (https://www.icc-cpi.int/)
- 2. Subsidiary Organs of the UN
- I. Peacebuilding-Commission (https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/peacebuilding-commission)
 - II. International Law Commission: (http://legal.un.org/ilc/)

ABOUT THE COMMITTEE

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (UN) and is charged with ensuring international peace and security, recommending the admission of new UN members to the General Assembly, and approving any changes to the UN Charter. Its powers as outlined in the United Nations Charter include establishing peacekeeping operations, enacting international sanctions, and authorizing military action. The UNSC is the only UN body with authority to issue resolutions that are binding on member states.

The Security Council consists of fifteen members, of which five are permanent: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These were the great powers that were the victors of World War II (or



their recognized successor states). Permanent members can veto (block) any substantive Security Council resolution, including those on the admission of new member states to the United Nations or nominees for the office of Secretary-General. This veto right does not carry over into General Assembly matters or votes, which are non-binding. The other ten members are elected on a regional basis for a term of two years. The body's presidency rotates monthly amongst its members.

MANDATE OF UNSC:

According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes:

- to maintain international peace and security;
- to develop friendly relations among nations;
- to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights;
- and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.

INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA OF THE COMMITTEE:

The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to international peace and security. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has played a pivotal role in addressing this issue by promoting disarmament, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This report will provide an overview of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, followed by case studies on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to highlight the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons.

UNDERSTANDING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any



other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

Between 1965 and 1968, the treaty was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a United Nations-sponsored organization based in Geneva, Switzerland.

The treaty defines nuclear-weapon states as those that have built and tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967; these are the United States (1945), Russia (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). Four other states are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons, while Israel is deliberately ambiguous regarding its nuclear weapons status.

Status and text of the Treaty

The Treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to further the goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use. Critics argue that the NPT cannot stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the motivation to acquire them. They express disappointment with the limited progress on nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have 13,400 warheads in their combined stockpile. Several high-ranking officials within the United Nations have said that they can do little to stop states using nuclear reactors to produce nuclear weapons.



2. UNSC's Role:

The UNSC is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It has the authority to take enforcement action against states that violate non-proliferation norms, including imposing sanctions and authorizing military intervention if necessary.

KEY EFFORTS IN NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

1.INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA):

- The IAEA monitors and verifies compliance with the NPT through inspections and safeguards agreements.
- It ensures that civilian nuclear programs are not diverted for military purposes.
- Status and understanding the role of the organisation:

While the IAEA is not a party to the NPT, it is entrusted with key verification responsibilities under the Treaty. Each non-nuclear-weapon State party is required under Article III of the NPT to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA to enable the IAEA to verify the fulfillment of their obligation under the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The IAEA therefore has a specific verification role as the international safeguards inspectorate, namely to verify the fulfillment of obligations assumed under the NPT by non-nuclear-weapon States parties. By 3 May 2023, 182 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have brought into force CSAs required by the Treaty and 4 of them have yet to do so.

The IAEA also has an important role to play in achieving the objectives under Article IV to foster international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Through its activities relevant to energy security, human health, food security and safety, water resource management and industrial applications, the IAEA supports its Member States in attaining their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).



1. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT):

- The CTBT prohibits all nuclear explosions, whether for military or civilian purposes.
- The treaty has not yet entered into force, as it requires ratification by all 44 states with nuclear capabilities.

Status and Understanding of the treaty:

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a multilateral treaty to ban nuclear weapons test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, for both civilian and military purposes, in all environments. It was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996, but has not entered into force, as eight specific nations have not ratified the treaty.

Obligations under the treaty:

- 1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
- 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

2. UNSC Resolutions:

- The UNSC has passed several resolutions to prevent nuclear proliferation, including Resolution 1540, which mandates that states implement measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Resolutions on specific countries, such as Iran (Resolutions 1929 and 2231) and North Korea (Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2375), aim to curb their nuclear programs.

3. Disarmament Initiatives:

- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START)
- START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction and the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The treaty was signed on 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5 December 1994.
- The treaty barred its signatories from deploying more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers.



- START negotiated the largest and most complex arms control treaty in history, and its final implementation in late 2001 resulted in the removal of about 80% of all strategic nuclear weapons then in existence. Proposed by US President Ronald Reagan, it was renamed START I after negotiations began on START II.
- The treaty expired on 5 December 2009.
- On 8 April 2010, the replacement New START Treaty was signed in Prague by US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Following its ratification by the US Senate and the Federal Assembly of Russia, the treaty went into force on 5 February 2011, extending deep reductions of American and Soviet or Russian strategic nuclear weapons through February 2026.

- The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)-

- The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), or the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty, is the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal being their total elimination. It was adopted on 7 July 2017, opened for signature on 20 September 2017, and entered into force on 22 January 2021.
- For those nations that are party to it, the treaty prohibits the development, testing, production, stockpiling, stationing, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as assistance and encouragement to the prohibited activities. For nuclear-armed states joining the treaty, it provides for a time-bound framework for negotiations leading to the verified and irreversible elimination of its nuclear weapons programme.
- A mandate adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 23 December 2016 scheduled two sessions for negotiations: 27 to 31 March and 15 June to 7 July 2017. The treaty passed on schedule on 7 July with 122 in favor, 1 against (Netherlands), and 1 official abstention (Singapore). Sixty-nine nations did not vote, among them all of the nuclear weapon states and all NATO members except the Netherlands.

CASE STUDIES

Case Study 1: Hiroshima

On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The bomb, codenamed "Little Boy," caused unprecedented devastation.



Impact:

- Immediate deaths: Approximately 70,000–80,000 people were killed instantly. - Injuries and long-term effects: Tens of thousands suffered severe injuries, radiation sickness, and long-term health effects such as cancer.
- Infrastructure: The explosion obliterated much of the city, leaving it in ruins.

Case Study 2: Nagasaki

Three days later, on August 9, 1945, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki. The bomb, codenamed "Fat Man," resulted in similar catastrophic consequences.

Impact:

- Immediate deaths: Around 40,000–75,000 people were killed instantly.
- Injuries and long-term effects: Survivors faced severe injuries, radiation sickness, and long-term health problems.
- Infrastructure: Significant portions of the city were destroyed, and the socioeconomic impact was profound.

Post Attack Casualties:

An estimated 90,000 to 140,000 people in Hiroshima (up to 39 percent of the population) and 60,000 to 80,000 people in Nagasaki (up to 32 percent of the population) died in 1945,though the number which died immediately as a result of exposure to the blast, heat, or due to radiation, is unknown. One Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission report discusses 6,882 people examined in Hiroshima and 6,621 people examined in Nagasaki, who were largely within 2,000 meters (6,600 ft) of the hypocenter, who suffered injuries from the blast and heat but died from complications frequently compounded by acute radiation syndrome (ARS), all within about 20 to 30 days. Many people not injured by the blast eventually died within that timeframe as well after suffering from ARS. At the time, the doctors had no idea what the cause was and were unable to effectively treat the condition

Legal Considerations of both the case studies:



The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which address the codes of wartime conduct on land and at sea, were adopted before the rise of air power. Despite repeated diplomatic attempts to update international humanitarian law to include aerial warfare, it was not updated before World War II. The absence of specific international humanitarian law did not mean aerial warfare was not covered under the laws of war, but rather that there was no general agreement of how to interpret those laws. This means that aerial bombardment of civilian areas in enemy territory by all major belligerents during World War II was not prohibited by positive or specific customary international humanitarian law.

In 1963 the bombings were subjected to judicial review in Ryuichi Shimoda v. The State. The District Court of Tokyo ruled the use of nuclear weapons in warfare was not illegal, but held in its obiter dictum that the atomic bombings of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were illegal under international law of that time, as an indiscriminate bombardment of undefended cities. The court denied the appellants compensation on the grounds that the Japanese government had waived the right for reparations from the U.S. government under the Treaty of San Francisco.

Lessons from Hiroshima and Nagasaki

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki highlighted the devastating human, environmental, and socio-economic consequences of nuclear weapons. These events underscored the urgent need for international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote disarmament.

Conclusion

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament remain critical for global security. The UNSC, through its resolutions and support for international treaties, plays a vital role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting disarmament. The lessons from Hiroshima and Nagasaki serve as a stark reminder of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons, reinforcing the importance of sustained and robust efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear threats.

Case Study 3: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

Background

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was a landmark arms control agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union (later



Russia) on December 8, 1987. The treaty aimed to eliminate both nations' stockpiles of intermediate-range and shorter-range land-based missiles (with ranges of 500-5,500 kilometers) and was a significant step towards nuclear disarmament during the Cold War.

Key Provisions of the Treaty

- Elimination of Missiles: The treaty required both parties to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, including launchers and associated equipment, within three years of the treaty's entry into force.
- Verification and Inspections: The treaty established a robust verification regime, including on-site inspections, to ensure compliance by both parties. The Special Verification Commission (SVC) was created to address compliance issues and manage the verification process.
- Types of Missiles Affected: The treaty specifically targeted ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles within the specified range. By the treaty's deadline in 1991, approximately 2,692 missiles had been destroyed (1,846 by the Soviet Union and 846 by the United States).

Implementation and Challenges

- Initial Compliance: Both the United States and the Soviet Union (and later Russia) complied with the treaty's requirements, leading to the elimination of a significant number of nuclear weapons and contributing to a reduction in Cold War tensions.
- Technological Advances and Evolving Threats: Over time, technological advancements and changing geopolitical dynamics raised concerns about the relevance and effectiveness of the INF Treaty. Both parties accused each other of developing and deploying systems that violated the treaty.
- US Withdrawal: In 2014, the United States publicly accused Russia of violating the treaty by developing and deploying a new ground-launched cruise missile (9M729). After unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue, the United States formally announced its withdrawal from the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019, citing Russia's non-compliance.
- Russia's Response: Russia denied the allegations and accused the United States of violating the treaty by deploying missile defense systems in Europe that could potentially be used for offensive purposes. Following the US announcement, Russia also suspended its participation in the treaty.

Current Status and Implications

 Treaty Termination: The INF Treaty officially expired on August 2, 2019, marking the end of an era in arms control. The collapse of the treaty has



- raised concerns about a new arms race and the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia.
- Regional and Global Impact: The end of the INF Treaty has significant implications for global security and arms control efforts. It has increased tensions between the United States and Russia and raised concerns among NATO allies and other countries about the potential deployment of intermediate-range missiles.
- Future Arms Control Efforts: The expiration of the INF Treaty highlights the challenges in maintaining and updating arms control agreements to address new technological developments and geopolitical realities. It underscores the need for new frameworks and agreements to manage the proliferation of advanced missile systems.

Conclusion

- Importance of Verification Mechanisms: The INF Treaty's success in eliminating a large number of nuclear weapons was largely due to its robust verification and inspection mechanisms. Future arms control agreements must include similar provisions to ensure compliance.
- Challenges of Technological Advancements: The case illustrates how technological advancements can outpace existing agreements, necessitating continuous updates and adaptations to arms control frameworks.
- Geopolitical Dynamics: The collapse of the INF Treaty demonstrates how geopolitical shifts and mutual distrust can undermine longstanding agreements. Building and maintaining trust between parties is crucial for the success of disarmament efforts.

GLOBAL APPROACHES

United States

- Approach: The United States has historically played a leading role in global non-proliferation efforts, advocating for strict enforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and supporting various arms control agreements.
- Policy: The US emphasizes the importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states, maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent, and pursuing arms control agreements.



 Recent Actions: The US withdrew from the INF Treaty citing Russian violations, and has shown hesitance in renewing the New START Treaty without addressing issues like China's growing nuclear arsenal.

Russia

- Approach: Russia also supports the NPT and engages in bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements but has been accused of noncompliance with certain treaties.
- Policy: Russia views its nuclear arsenal as crucial for its national security and has modernized its nuclear forces. It supports non-proliferation but often disputes US accusations and policies.
- Recent Actions: Russia has been accused of violating the INF Treaty and has expressed interest in extending the New START Treaty, which limits US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals.

China

- Approach: China advocates for global disarmament and supports the NPT but has a relatively opaque nuclear policy compared to the US and Russia.
- **Policy:** China maintains a minimum deterrent policy, aiming for a no-first-use doctrine, and emphasizes the importance of multilateral disarmament.
- Recent Actions: China has been increasing its nuclear capabilities and modernization, leading to calls from the US and its allies for China to join arms control discussions.

France

- Approach: France is a strong proponent of the NPT and engages actively in European and international non-proliferation efforts.
- Policy: France maintains a robust nuclear deterrent and supports disarmament efforts while ensuring its national security.
- Recent Actions: France has participated in discussions for new arms control frameworks and continues to support the global non-proliferation regime.

United Kingdom

 Approach: The UK supports the NPT and has reduced its nuclear arsenal significantly since the Cold War.



- **Policy:** The UK focuses on maintaining a minimum credible deterrent and actively engages in international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.
- Recent Actions: The UK has modernized its nuclear forces and supports initiatives to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

India

- Approach: India has not signed the NPT, arguing that it is discriminatory, but it has a strong commitment to non-proliferation norms and has declared a no-first-use policy.
- Policy: India maintains a credible minimum deterrent and supports global disarmament while ensuring its national security.
- Recent Actions: India has engaged in nuclear agreements with various countries and has sought to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to strengthen its non-proliferation credentials.

North Korea

- Approach: North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has since pursued nuclear weapons development, posing significant challenges to global non-proliferation efforts.
- Policy: North Korea views its nuclear arsenal as essential for regime survival and leverage in international negotiations.
- Recent Actions: North Korea continues to conduct nuclear tests and missile launches, leading to international sanctions and diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

NOTE: The countries specified here are just a few examples within the matrix of nuclear non-proliferation. Delegates are encouraged to conduct detailed research on these and other relevant countries independently.



PARTING NOTE:

This Background Guide is intended to provide a comprehensive foundation for understanding the agenda of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. However, the complexity and dynamism of the topic require delegates to engage in extensive independent research and bring diverse perspectives to the committee. Your active participation and well-informed contributions are crucial for fostering meaningful and productive debates. We look forward to seeing your dedication and insights enrich the discussions and drive towards impactful resolutions.

Good luck, and have fun!



